We combine compositional reasoning and reachability analysis to formally verify the safety of a recent cache coherence protocol. The protocol is a detailed implementation of token coherence, an approach that decouples correctness and performance. First, we present a formal and abstract specification that captures the safety substrate of token coherence, and highlights the symmetry in states of the cache controllers and contents of the messages they exchange. Then, we prove that this abstract specification is coherent, and check whether the implementation proposed by the protocol designers is a refinement of the abstract specification. Our refinement proof is parametric in the number of cache controllers, and is compositional as it reduces the refinement checks to individual controllers using a specialized form of assume-guarantee reasoning. The individual refinement obligations are discharged using refinement maps and reachability analysis. While the formal proof justifies the intuitive claim by the designers about the ease of verifiability of token coherence, we report on several bugs in the implementation, and accompanying modifications, that were missed by extensive prior simulations. * This research was partially supported by the NSF award CCR0306382, and a donation from Intel Corporation.
INTRODUCTION

Introduction
Shared memory multiprocessors have become the most important architecture used for commercial and scientific workloads. Such systems use hardware cache coherence protocols to create the illusion of a single, shared memory without caches. These protocols are important factors of the overall system performance, and numerous optimizations contribute to their complexity. Since hard-to-cover race conditions elude simulations of the protocols, formal methods are often employed to verify their correctness.
Token Coherence is a new approach to cache coherence protocols that decouples correctness requirements from performance choices, claiming to improve both performance and verifiability [23] . Separate correctness mechanisms ensure safety and liveness. Safety is achieved by token counting: per memory location, the number of tokens in the system is a global invariant. By requiring at least one token for read access and all tokens for write access, the protocol directly enforces a single-writer, multiple-reader policy. On the other hand, Liveness is achieved by persistent requests. This reliable, but slower protocol is used when the regular requests do not succeed within a timeout period. Persistent requests are required because the regular requests, while likely to complete quickly, do not guarantee eventual success.
In this work, we combine compositional verification and model checking to verify the safety of a detailed implementation of a token coherence protocol for an arbitrary number of caches. Our method takes advantage of the opportunities offered by the token coherence design. It proceeds in four steps. bottom (silent) process { } has but one trace: the empty string. The top (universal) process Σ * includes all possible traces.
When composing processes, we merge their traces by interleaving their events and hiding mutual communication.
Definition 2.2 Let u, v, w ∈ Σ * be traces. We define the relation u | v w (speak: u, v can combine to form w) by the following inference rules:
Example 2.3 Let Σ e = {a, b, c, d} and Σ c = {e, e}. Then we have ab | cd acbd ab | cd abcd ae | eb ab ae | eb aeeb but not ae | eb ba.
Definition 2.4 Let P , Q be processes. Then P | Q . = {w ∈ Σ * | ∃u ∈ P : ∃v ∈ Q : u | v w}.
Composition is commutative, which follows from Lemma E.1 below. It is also associative, which follows from Lemma E.2 below.
Lemma E.1 Let u, v, w ∈ Σ * . If u | v w, then v | u w.
Proof. We prove this by induction on the derivation of u | v w, with a case distinction on the type of the last rule used.
case (epsilon):
In this case, u = v, so the claim is immediate.
case (l-event):
In this case, we have a derivation for u σ | v w σ.
We have a derivation subtree for u | v w . By induction, v | u w . Apply (r-event) to get v | u w.
case (r-event):
In this case, we have a derivation for u | v σ w σ.
We have a derivation subtree for u | v w . By induction, v | u w . Apply (l-event) to get v | u w.
case (communication):
In this case, we have a derivation for u σ | v σ w.
We have a derivation subtree for u | v w. By induction, v | u w. Apply (communication) to get v | u w.
Lemma E.2 Let u 1 , u 2 , u 3 , v, w ∈ Σ * . If the following two conditions hold:
Then there exists a word z ∈ Σ * such that both of the following hold:
Proof.
The proof proceeds by induction on the sum of the depths of the derivation trees for (1) and (2) . We do a case distinction on what inference rules are used at the bottom of those derivations. For each combination of inference rules, there is at least one matching proof case.
case (epsilon),(epsilon):
We are given derivations for (1), (2) of the form | and | Set z = . This gives (3) by (epsilon) and (4) by (epsilon).
these combinations are not possible, because the variable v can not match both and v σ.
case (communication),(any):
We are given derivations for (1),(2) of the form u 1 σ | u 2 σ v and v | u 3 w Furthermore, we have a derivation subtree for u 1 | u 2 v By the induction hypothesis, there exists a z ∈ Σ * such that (a) u 1 | z w (b) u 2 | u 3 z Now set z = z σ. Then we get (3) from (a) by (communication), and we get (4) from (b) by (l-event).
case (any),(r-event):
We are given derivations for (1),(2) of the form u 1 | u 2 v and v | u 3 σ w σ Furthermore, we have a derivation subtree for v | u 3 w By the induction hypothesis, there exists a z ∈ Σ * such that (a) u 1 | z w (b) u 2 | u 3 z Now set z = z σ. Then we get (3) from (a) by (r-event), and we get (4) from (b) by (r-event).
case (l-event),(l-event):
We are given derivations for (1),(2) of the form u 1 σ | u 2 v σ and v σ | u 3 w σ Furthermore, we have derivation subtrees for u 1 | u 2 v and v | u 3 w By the induction hypothesis, there exists a z ∈ Σ * such that (a) u 1 | z w (b) u 2 | u 3 z Now we get (3) from (a) by (l-event), and (4) is (b).
case (r-event),(l-event):
We are given derivations for (1),(2) of the form u 1 | u 2 σ v σ and v σ | u 3 w σ Furthermore, we have derivation subtrees for u 1 | u 2 v and v | u 3 w By the induction hypothesis, there exists a z ∈ Σ * such that
Then we get (3) from (a) by (r-event), and we get (4) from (b) by (l-event).
We are given derivations for (1),(2) of the form u 1 σ | u 2 v σ and v σ | u 3 σ w Furthermore, we have derivation subtrees for u 1 | u 2 v and v | u 3 w By the induction hypothesis, there exists a z ∈ Σ * such that (a) u 1 | z w (b) u 2 | u 3 z Now set z = z σ. Then we get (3) from (a) by (communication), and we get (4) from (b) by (r-event).
case (r-event),(communication):
We are given derivations for (1),(2) of the form u 1 | u 2 σ v σ and v σ | u 3 σ w Furthermore, we have derivation subtrees for u 1 | u 2 v and v | u 3 w By the induction hypothesis, there exists a z ∈ Σ * such that (a) u 1 | z w (b) u 2 | u 3 z Now (a) already is (3), and we get (4) from (b) by (communication).
Like in CCS [27] , composition does not restrict its components: for processes P, Q we always have P P | Q. This follows from Lemma E.3. Furthermore, for all processes P , P | { } = P . This follows from the above, and from Lemma E.4. Lemma E.3 For any u ∈ Σ * , u | u and | u u.
Proof. By induction on the length of u. If u = , then the result is direct from rule (epsilon). Otherwise, u = u σ for some σ ∈ Σ. By induction, u | u and | u u . Application of the rules (l-event) and (r-event), respectively, then implies the result.
Proof. We prove that u | v implies u = v (the other follows with Lemma E.1, using induction on the derivation of u | v, with a case distinction on the last rule used. case (epsilon): u = v is immediate from the matching.
In this case, u = u σ and v = v σ for some σ ∈ Σ.
We have a derivation subtree for u | v . By induction, u = v , and therefore u = v.
case (r-event): case (communication):
These are impossible -they don't match .
Refinement is preserved by composition: if P P , then P | Q P | Q. We can use this fact to prove that a system implementation refines its specification
from the simpler, local refinement conditions
However, this method is not very powerful, because the refinements (6) do often not hold because of implicit assumptions on the context. Assume-guarantee reasoning remedies this shortcoming. We provide the context as an explicit subscript to the refinement relation, enabling us to conclude (5) from
Most process models used for compositional refinement of hardware [2, 25] can express the contextual refinement P Q P directly as P Q P (using synchronous parallel composition). The same does not work in our context (as exemplified by the observation 5 below), so we use a direct definition instead. Definition 2.5 (Contextual refinement.) Let P, P , C be processes. Then P is said to refine P in context C, written P C P , iff for all traces u ∈ P the following condition holds: if there is a trace v ∈ C such that u ↑ Σ c = v ↑ Σ c (i.e. the communication events in u, v match up), then u ∈ P .
Intuitively, we require that all behaviors of P that are actually possible within an environment that adheres to C are allowed by P .
The following observations provide insight about contextual refinement.
1. For any process C, C is a pre-order on processes.
2. If P C P , and C C, then P C P .
3. Refinement in a universal context corresponds to regular refinement:
4. Refinement in a silent context corresponds to refinement of closed processes:
5. The refinement P | C { } P | C does not imply P C P , because the traces of P | C do not indicate what mutual communication takes place. However, the converse always holds.
The following Lemma shows how contextual refinement and composition are related to each other.
Proof. First, we show the implication '⇒', using induction on the sum of the lengths of u and v. We make a case distinction based on the kind of the last events in u and v.
• If u = , then u ↑ Σ c = , therefore v ↑ Σ c = , and therefore v ∈ Σ * e . Now choose w = v, and because we know | v v by Lemma E.3, we get u | v w.
• If v = , then v ↑ Σ c = , so u ↑ Σ c = , and therefore u ∈ Σ * e . Now choose w = u, and because we know u | u by Lemma E.3, we get u | v w.
• If u = u σ with σ ∈ Σ e , then u ↑ Σ c = u ↑ Σ c and by induction, there must exist a w ∈ Σ * e such that u | v w . Now choose w = w σ, and by applying (l-event) we get u | v w.
• If v = v σ with σ ∈ Σ e , then v ↑ Σ c = v ↑ Σ c and by induction, there must exist a w ∈ Σ * e such that u | v w . Now choose w = w σ, and by applying (r-event) we get u | v w.
• If u = u σ and v = v τ with σ, τ ∈ Σ c , then
it must be the case that τ = σ and u ↑ Σ c = v ↑ Σ c . By induction, there must exist a w ∈ Σ * e such that u | v w. Now we simply apply (communication) to get u | v w. Now, we show the implication '⇐', using induction on the derivation of u | v w, with a case distinction on the last rule used.
case (epsilon):
In this case, u = v = and therefore trivially
In this case, u = u σ and w = w σ for some σ ∈ Σ. Because w ∈ Σ * e , we must have σ ∈ Σ e and w ∈ Σ * e . We have a derivation subtree for u | v w .
In this case, v = v σ and w = w σ for some σ ∈ Σ. Because w ∈ Σ * e , we must have σ ∈ Σ e and w ∈ Σ * e . We have a derivation subtree for u | v w .
In this case, u = v σ and v = v σ for some σ ∈ Σ c . We have a derivation subtree for u | v w.
To avoid circularity in the assume-guarantee reasoning, we conservatively require that the specification processes can always engage in a subset of communication events Σ r ⊂ Σ c that is sufficiently large, i.e. Σ r ∪ Σ r = Σ c ; in our case, we will take care of this requirement by having specification processes accept any message at any time 1 . We use the following definition to formalize this property of processes. Definition 2.6 Let P be a process over Σ, and Σ r ⊂ Σ be an event subset. P is called Σ r -enabled iff ∀u ∈ P : ∀σ ∈ Σ r : uσ ∈ P .
We now give the two proof rules for compositional refinement. The first rule is simpler, but restricted to two components. The second rule is a generalization suited for induction.
Theorem 2.7 Let P, P , Q, Q , C be processes over Σ = Σ e ∪ Σ c . Let Σ r ⊂ Σ c such that Σ r ∪ Σ r = Σ c . Then the following proof rules are sound:
We need only prove the second rule since the first can be obtained from the second by setting C = { }.
Suppose we are given processes P, Q, P , Q , C that satisfy the hypotheses of the proof rule. Suppose that u ∈ P | Q and v ∈ C and u ↑ Σ c = v ↑ Σ c . There must be a derivation for u ∈ P | Q , say p | q u for some p ∈ P and q ∈ Q . By Lemma E.5, there exists a w ∈ Σ * e such that u | v w. Now Lemma E.6 tells us that in this situation, p ∈ P and q ∈ Q.. Because p | q u, this implies that u ∈ P | Q. Therefore, P | Q C P | Q.
Lemma E.6 Let P, Q, P , Q , C be processes, let Σ r ⊂ Σ c such that Σ r ∪ Σ r = Σ c , let both P, Q be Σ r -enabled, let P Q|C P , let Q P |C Q and let p ∈ P , q ∈ Q , v ∈ C. Now, if p | q u for some u ∈ Σ * , and u | c w for some w ∈ Σ * e , then p ∈ P and q ∈ Q.
Proof. We prove this by induction on the derivation of p | q u, with a case distinction on the kind of rule used last. case (epsilon):
In this case, p = q = and therefore p ∈ P and q ∈ Q.
In this case, we have p = p σ, u = u σ and derivations p σ | q u σ and u σ | c w We have a derivation subtree for p | q u . By Lemma E.7, there are c ∈ C and w ∈ Σ * e such that u | c w . By induction, p ∈ P and q ∈ Q.
In this case, we have q = q σ, u = u σ and derivations p | q σ u σ and u σ | c w We have a derivation subtree for p | q u . By Lemma E.7, there are c ∈ C and w ∈ Σ * e such that u | c w . By induction, p ∈ P and q ∈ Q.
By Lemma E.1 and Lemma E.2, there is a z ∈ Σ * such that
Furthermore, (b) and p ∈ P imply that z ∈ P | C. Therefore, by Q P |C Q, we have q ∈ Q.
case (communication):
In this case, we have p = p σ, q = q σ, and derivations p σ | q σ u and u | c w We have a derivation subtree for p | q u. By induction, p ∈ Q and q ∈ Q. Now, at least one of σ ∈ Σ r or σ ∈ Σ r . Therefore, p σ ∈ P or q σ ∈ Q, and therefore p ∈ P or q ∈ Q. Say q ∈ Q.
Proceed as in the second part of the (l-event)-clause above. Say p ∈ P .
Proceed as in the second part of the (r-event)-clause above.
If u is a prefix of u, then there exist prefixes v of v and w of w such that u | v w .
Proof. We prove this first for the special case where u = u σ. The general case can then be obtained by induction on the length difference between u and its prefix u . For the special case u = u σ, we use induction on the derivation of u | v w, with a case distinction on the type of rule used last.
case (epsilon):
This case is impossible.
In this case, we have a derivation of u σ | v w σ.
We have a derivation subtree for u | v w . This directly confirms the claim since w is a prefix of w.
case (r-event):
In this case, we have a derivation of u σ | v τ w τ . We have a derivation subtree for u σ | v w . By induction, there exist prefixes u of u and v of v such that u | v w . This confirms the claim since v is a prefix of v and w is a prefix of w.
case (communication):
In this case, we have a derivation of u σ | v σ w.
We have a derivation subtree for u | v w. This directly confirms the claim since v is a prefix of v.
For example, consider again the local refinement obligations (7) . Suppose that the specification processes P, Q can receive messages at any time. We can then apply the first proof rule to conclude that P | Q refines P | Q, if there is no external communication, i.e., there are no other components in the system.
Token Coherence
In this section, we introduce a formal specification of the safety substrate of token coherence. This abstract protocol is a generalization of the MOESI token counting rules in Martin's dissertation [21] . We then justify it's use as a specification, by proving that it is coherent, and with it any implementation that refines it.
Background: Cache Coherence
Cache coherence describes the contract between the memory system and the processor in a shared-memory multiprocessor. It is typically established at the granularity of a cache block. A memory system is cache coherent if for each block, writes are serialized, and reads get the value of the last write.
Definition 3.1 Let V be the set of values of a fixed cache block, and v 0 ∈ V the initial value. Let Σ rw = {rd(v), wr(v) | v ∈ V } be the alphabet of events, describing accesses to the block by some processor. Then the coherent traces of the system are given by the following regular language over Σ rw :
Token coherence, like many contemporary coherence protocols such as the popular MOESI protocol family [33] , provides this strong form of coherence by enforcing a "single writer, multiple reader" policy 2 .
Whether a cache block can be read and/or written is determined by its permission state, one of {L, L r , L rw } (see also figure 1 for more detail). The cache coherence protocol then enforces the following important mutual exclusion property: If one cache is in L rw state, all other caches are in L state.
For example, the popular MOESI protocol family [33] fits into our permission scheme as follows: the I state is L, both S and O are L r , and both M and E are L rw .
Token coherence guarantees mutual exclusion by requiring since an agent need by assigning a fixed number m of tokens to each cache block. These tokens are 2 We are considering only the interface between the memory system and the processor here. Independently, the contract between the processor and the programmer may use weaker forms of coherence that involve temporal reordering of events, as specified by the memory model. 
and for v, w ∈ V we have δ contain 1) local access transitions:
2) protocol-controlled transitions: of the form q − → q with q, q ∈ Q. The protocol implementation controls these state changes. The mutual exclusion has additional applications beyond just cache coherence: some processor designs directly exploit the per-address mutual exclusion provided by the cache coherence protocol, to implement synchronization primitives, or for optimizations such as speculative loads or speculative retirement [31] .
The abstract protocol
In our abstract protocol, system components and messages are of the same type and treated completely symmetrically: both are represented by token bags. Token bags are finite multisets (or bags) over some set T of tokens, and may be required to satisfy some additional constraints (well-formedness). The tokens in the bag constitute the state of the component, or the contents of the message.
The state of the entire system is represented as yet another bag that encloses the token bags of the individual components and messages. The sending of a message is modeled as a division, where a bag separates into two bags, dividing its tokens. The receipt of a message, symmetrically, is modeled as a fusion of token bags. Change is expressed by local reactions: tokens within a bag can be consumed, produced or modified according to rewrite rules.
We now formalize the general behavior of such token transition systems, which prepares us for defining the actual abstract protocol. 
Token transition systems have a feel of concurrency much like a biological system where reactive substances are contained in cells that can undergo fusion and division. Chemical abstract machines [6] capture the same idea (with molecules, membranes, and solutions instead of tokens, bags, and configurations), but are also different in many ways (for example, they do not have fusion or division).
Example E.8 Suppose our tokens are electrons , positrons ⊕, and gamma rays γ, and we have a reaction where electrons and positrons annihilate each other, emitting a gamma ray:
Then the following is a trajectory of the system:
What happens is that the left bag splits off a bag containing a single ⊕. This bag is then absorbed by the right bag. The latter now contains the ingredients needed for the "fire" reaction, so it can react. R is a regular token as used by token coherence.
O(s)
is a owner token in one of two states s ∈ {C, D} (clean or dirty). D(v) is an instance of the data, with value v ∈ V . M (v) is a memory cell containing the value v ∈ V .
The abstract protocol
• B is defined by imposing two conditions on a token bag x ∈ M(T ):
-if x contains data D(v), then it must contain at least one regular token R or an owner token O(s).
-if x contains a dirty owner token O(D), then it must contain data D(v).
•
• Σ e . = {rd(v), wr(v), memread, memwrite, copy, drop | v ∈ V }.
• W consists of the rewrite rules shown in table 1. Table 2 shows an example trajectory of the abstract protocol. Next, we explain the reaction rules and their interaction in some more detail.
rd(v) reads a value from a data instance (it can be applied at any time, and does not modify the state). wr(w) modifies a data token, and can only be applied if all m tokens (one owner token and m − 1 regular tokens) are present, and no other data copies are in the same bag (which guarantees that the data token being modified is the only one in the system).
To guarantee proper writebacks of modified data, a special owner token is used. The owner token records the clean/dirty state, i.e. whether the memory value is stale. When modifying data, the owner token is set to dirty. When the memory writes back the data (memwrite), the owner token is cleaned. memread loads data from the memory only if there is a clean owner token, and thereby avoids reading stale data.
The rules copy and drop imply that data instances D(v) can be freely copied or destroyed, subject only to the restriction enforced by B that all bags are well-formed -for example, whoever has the dirty owner token must keep at least one data instance.
We can now prove that the abstract protocol is coherent.
Theorem 3.5
The closed system T m ∩ Σ * e is coherent:
Proof. To prove this, verify that (1) all of the following invariants hold in the initial state I and (2) prove (by induction on derivations) that if the invariants hold for a state C, they hold for any state C such that C u − → C for some u ∈ Σ * e .
1. The number of regular tokens R in the system is m − 1.
There is always exactly one owner token O(s).
3. There is always exactly one memory cell M (v).
All data instances D(v) have the same values.
3 TOKEN COHERENCE 3.2 The abstract protocol
wr(w): 
C 2 requests S (requests are abstracted away) Table 2 : A short example trajectory of the abstract protocol, representing a system with a memory D and two caches C 1 and C 2 . For clarification, token bags carry subscripts indicating the component that they represent. Those subscripts are not part of the abstract protocol.
5. If the owner token is clean, any data instances present have the same value as the memory cell.
6. If there is a data token, it contains the value of the last write. Otherwise, the memory does.
We proceed by induction on the derivation of C u − → C , with a case distinction on the last derivation used. Since the invariants are predicates on states, it is immediately clear that they are preserved in the case (stutter), and the case (trans) is a straighforward induction. The cases (fusion) and (division) preserve the invariants because the latter are insensitive to how the tokens are partititioned into bags. The cases (send) and (receive) can not apply because we assumed u ∈ Σ * e . Finally, the rule (reaction) is the only interesting case, and we will examine it in detail.
First, invariants 1, 2 and 3 must be preserved because the reactions preserve the number of R, O and M tokens. We examine the remaining invariants 4, 5, and 6 separately for each reaction.
Invariant 4 is obviously preserved by rd(v), memwrite, copy and drop. The rule memwrite also preserves it, because invariant 5 guarantees that in this situation, the memory has the same value as all existing data tokens. Finally, the rule wr(w) preserves the invariant because the data token that participates in the reaction must be the only data token in the whole system. This is because any other tokens would have to either be in a different bag (which, by B, they can't be without an accompanying R or O token, and we know that there are no R or O tokens in any other bag because by invariants 1 and 2, there is a fixed number of them, and they are all in this bag), or in the same bag (which they can't be because they would inhibit the reaction).
Invariant 5 is obviously preserved by rd(v), copy and drop. It is preserved by wr(w), because it is vacously satisfied after the reaction. Similarly, it becomes true after memwrite. And it is also preserved by memread, which creates a new data token with the same value as the memory.
Invariant 6 is true after wr(w), because there is just one data token (as argued for Invariant 4). It is clearly preserved by rd(v), copy and memwrite. It is preserved by drop because either the token being dropped is not the last one (in which case the remaining data tokens keep the value), or it is the last one (in which case the memory must be up-to-date, because of invariant 5 and the fact that the owner token must be clean, which is because a dirty owner token requires the presence of a data token, because of B). It is preserved by memread because either the newly created token is not the only one (in which case invariant 4 helps us), or it is the only one (in which case we know that the value read from memory is the value of the last write).
Together, these invariants guarantee that all data instances D(v) are always up-to-date; therefore, reads get the correct value which implies coherence.
All state is modeled by tokens, and there is no distinction between components and messages. This symmetry points out interesting design directions. For example, we consider the memory cell M (v) to be stationary. However, the formal token rules do not impose this restriction and and could be used as an implementation guideline for a system with home migration.
How a TTS is an LTS
For completeness, and for use by later proofs, we show how our token transition systems can be understood as LTSs, and that our processes compose in the same way that the LTSs do. We include this section only in the extended version since it is quite technical in a boring way.
To define the LTS corresponding to a TTS, we use exactly the same inference rules as for defining the traces of a TTS, except that we do not include the (stutter) and (trans) rule (since they are redundant once we take the trace set of the LTS). To avoid possible confusion when referencing these rules, we added primes to the rule names in this section.
Definition E.9 The token transition system S = (T, B, I, Σ e , W ) defines a labeled transition system LTS(S) . = (Q, q0, Σ ∪ { }, δ) where
and δ is defined by the inference rules
Definition E.10 For a labeled transition system (Q, q0, Σ∪{ }, δ), states q 1 , q 2 ∈ Q and a word v ∈ Σ * we define: q v =⇒ q iff there exists a k ≥ 0 and a sequence of transitions q 0
Definition E.11 For an LTS
Lemma E.12 Let P be the process defined by the token transitions systems S. Then L(LTS(S)) = P .
Proof. For the '⊂' direction, we are given a word w and a transition sequence as in definition E.10. For each transition, we have a primed rule as listed under definition E.9. We can then transform this transition sequence into a derivation for I w − → C, by taking, for each transition, the corresponding non-primed rule (as listed under definition 3.3), and glueing them together with (trans). This then shows that w ∈ P .
For the '⊃' direction, we show that for all derivations of C u − → C , there exists a state sequence as in definition E.9, with w = u and q 0 = C and q k = C (we do so by induction on the derivation of I u − → C). From that, we conclude that for all u such that I u − → C for some C, we must have u ∈ L(LTS(S)).
Definition E.13 For two LTSs
where δ is defined by the inference rules
Lemma E.14 For two LTSs M i = (Q i , q0 i , Σ ∪ { }, δ i ) (with i ∈ {1, 2})), the following holds:
)) we say that M 2 can simulate M 1 if there exists a weak simulation relation. A weak simulation relation is a relation S ⊂ Q 1 × Q 2 such that (S1) (q0 1 , q0 2 ) ∈ S (S2) for all (q 1 , q 2 ) ∈ S, and for all transitions q 1 u − → δ1 q 1 , there exists a state q 2 ∈ Q 2 such that (q1 , q2 ) ∈ S and q 2 u =⇒ δ2 q 2 . 
Implementation
In this section, we describe how we verified the safety of a detailed implementation of token coherence for an arbitrary number of caches. We describe how we used compositional verification to deal with the parametric character, and how we employed abstraction to handle the fine level of detail. We conclude with a list of discovered bugs.
The Protocol Implementation
The protocol implementation was developed by Martin et al. for architecture research on token coherence [21] , and was extensively simulated prior to this work. It consists of finite state machines (FSM) for the cache and memory controllers, augmented with message passing capabilities. The FSMs are specified using the domain-specific language SLICC (Specification Language for Implementing Cache Coherence) developed by Martin et al.
The FSMs include all necessary transient states that arise due to the asynchronous nature of the protocol. The memory and cache controller amount to 600 and 1800 lines of SLICC code, respectively, a scale on which purely manual analysis methods are impractical, in particular because these low-level specifications are usually changed over time.
The SLICC compiler generates (1) executables for the simulation environment and (2) summary tables containing the control states, events and transitions in a human-readable table format 4 . Figure 2 shows the summary table for the memory controller, with its 3 states and 11 events. Note that some parts of the state, such as the number of tokens, or the actual data values, are stored in variables that are not visible in the summary table.
Due to lack of space, we can not reproduce the summary table for the cache controller (17 states and 20 events), and we can not explain further the meaning of the states and events. The complete SLICC code and interactive HTMLtables are online [22] , along with implementations of three other cache coherence protocols.
Parametric Compositional Refinement Proof
Consider the system S n consisting of n caches C , a directory controller D (which is attached to the memory, and sometimes called memory controller), and a interconnection network N . We consistently use primes for implementation processes to distinguish them from specification processes:
In the beginning, the memory holds all tokens. We define local specification processes as token transition systems:
Because a token transition system already models all conceivable distributions of state over the system, no new behavior emerges if we compose. This "selfsimilarity" is an important feature in our induction proof, and expressed in the following general proposition:
Proposition E.17 Let P i be three processes (i ∈ {1, 2, 3}) defined by the token transitions systems S i = (T, B, I i , Σ e , W ) (which are identical except for their initial states). Then, if I 1 I 2 = I 3 , we have P 1 | P 2 = P 3 .
Proof.
We adopt the LTS view of transition systems for this proof, as developed in section 3.3. We denote the respective labeled transition systems
For the direction '⊃', note that the transition system M 1 | M 2 can simulate M 3 because (1) we can first send all bags from M 2 to M 1 , which does not produce any observed behavior, and makes the states of M 1 match the state of M 3 , and (2) from there on, we can simulate all transitions of M 3 with identical transitions of M 1 , using (l-event') to embed
For the direction '⊂', we let M 3 simulate M 1 | M 2 by the following relation:
Parametric Compositional Refinement Proof
To show that S is a weak simulation, we need to show that it satisfies the properties (S1) and (S2) in definition E.15. (S1) is direct from the assumptions. For (S2), we make a case distinction on the kind of transition of
First, assume we are dealing with (l-event') or (r-event'). We can then match all possible transitions (one of (fusion'), (divsion'), (reaction'), (send') or (receive')) because q 1 q 2 = q3 means that the bags that are involved in producing the transition in q 1 or q 2 can produce the same transition in q 3 . −−−→ q 2 . Then we must have q 1 q 2 = q1 q 2 = q 3 , so we are o.k. because q 3 =⇒ q 3 .
We now state the central result which (together with Theorem 3.5) allows us to verify the implementation components D , C and N individually, each within an abstracted context rather than a fully instantiated system.
Theorem 4.1 If the implementation processes satisfy the local refinement obligations
then for all n ∈ N, we have S n { } T m , i.e., the system refines the formal token coherence protocol.
Proof.
Using proposition E.17, we obtain the following equalities, which allow us to split and merge specification processes as needed during the proof:
The following expresses the fact that a collection of n caches behaves just like a single cache, and we prove it by induction:
For n = 1, it coincides with (10). As for n (n + 1): the equation (12) can be expanded in the induction hypothesis (14) to yield
and the same expansion in (10) produces
Now, (15) and (16) are plugged into theorem 2.7 to get the following
from which we can complete the induction by using (13) . Now, we add the network. First, we expand (12) in (11) to get
which can be plugged into theorem 2.7, along with (15) , to get
which can be reduced to the following using (13):
Finally, we plug (9) and (19) into the theorem and get
whose right-hand side can be collapsed by (12) to complete the proof.
Discharging the Obligations
To discharge the remaining obligations, we used manual translation, abstraction, and annotation, and the explicit model checker Murϕ [13, 12] . The following steps give an overview of the method.
1. Obtain models D , C for the memory and cache controller implementations. This step involves translating the SLICC code to Murϕ, instrumenting it with the read/write events relevant for coherence, and abstracting both the state space and the message format. Fig. 3 shows snippets of translated code. The SLICC instructions that fell prey to the abstraction are in slanted face. For example, only a single cache block is modeled, therefore the code dealing with addresses is abstracted away. Also, message source and destination fields are irrelevant due to the deep symmetry of formal token coherence. Furthermore, two data values are sufficient 5 .
2. Obtain good encodings for the specification/environment processes D, C. We can take advantage (1) of the global system invariants established earlier and (2) of the fact that fusion and division are not observable. For example, the flattening map
. . b k provides a canonical representative state. This means that a single T -bag, rather than a multiset of T -bags, is sufficient to model the context. The models we obtain this way are compact and contribute much to the state-space economy of our approach.
Proposition 4.3 Let I, S and C be processes defined by the trace sets of the labeled transition systems L i . = (Q i , q0 i , Σ ∪ { }, δ i ) with i ∈ {I, S, C}. Let φ : Q I → Q S be a function (the refinement map). If R ⊂ Q I × Q C is a relation such that (R1) (q0 I , q0 C ) ∈ R, and φ(q0
(R4) If (q I , q C ) ∈ R and q I σ − → q I and q C σ − → q C for some σ ∈ Σ c , then (q I , q C ) ∈ R and φ(q I ) σ =⇒ φ(q I ).
then I C S.
Proof. We first prove the following statement. Let the circumstances be as described above.
If u, v ∈ Σ * and w ∈ Σ * e such that u | v w (21)
then both of the following hold:
The proposition then follows: for given u ∈ I, v ∈ C such that u ↑ Σ c = v ↑ Σ c , we know by Lemma E.5 that there exists a w ∈ Σ e such that u | v w. The above statement then implies u ∈ S. Because this is true for any such u, v, it implies I C S.
For the proof of the statement, we do a simultaneous induction on the structures of (21), (22) and (23) . To make it more clear that this is a well founded induction, we can define an integer metric that strictly decreases: the sum of the depth of the derivation and the lengths of the sequences satisfies this property. The induction proceeds by case distinction on the types of the last derivation of (21) and the last transitions in the sequences (22) and (23) .
case (any, any, ):
In this case, (23) has the form q0 C v =⇒ q C − → q C By induction, (q I , q C ) ∈ R and q0 S u =⇒ φ(q I ). The first implies (24) by (R2). The second is (25) . case (any, , any):
In this case, (22) has the form q0 I u =⇒ q I − → q I By induction, (q I , q C ) ∈ R and q0 S u =⇒ φ(q I ). By (R3), we get (24) and φ(q I ) =⇒ φ(q I ), and from there (25) .
case ((epsilon), any, any):
Note that the cases for nontrivial sequences (22) and (23) are already covered (since they can only contain transitions). Therefore, it suffices to consider q I = q0 I and q C = q0 C For which (R1) implies the claims (24) and (25) .
case ((r-event), any, σ):
In this case, we have a derivation for u | v σ w σ and we know q0 By induction, (q I , q C ) ∈ R and q0 S u =⇒ φ(q I ). By (R4), we get (24) and φ(q I ) σ =⇒ φ(q I ), and from there (25) .
The full Murϕ code is available online [8] .
Results
The translation required about two days of work. This estimate assumes familiarity with token coherence, and some knowledge of the implementation. We found several bugs of varying severity, all of which were missed by prior random We make three main contributions. First, we formally verified the safety of a system-level implementation of token coherence, for an arbitrary number of caches. Second, we developed a general and formal specification of the safety substrate of token coherence, and prove its correctness. Third, we demonstrated that token coherence's "design for verification" approach indeed facilitates the verification as claimed.
Future work may address the following open issues. First, the methodology does not currently address liveness. Second, other protocols or concurrent computations may benefit from the high-level abstraction expressed by token transition systems, and offer opportunities for compositional refinement along the same lines. Third, much room for automation remains: for example, we could attempt to integrate theorem provers with the SLICC compiler.
